India is on the path of gradual normalisation of ties with China. The resumption of Kailash Mansarovar Yatra is likely to be followed by restarting direct flights and adoption of a new visa regime that will facilitate more travel across categories between both countries.
Does this signal a strategic shift? Not really, because China's active political and military support to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor is a warning on how deep this nexus runs. At the same time, Indian business is grappling with supply chain issues with China, hit also by latest restrictions on rare earth magnets, other elements and added certification requirements.
At best, it's a pragmatic approach to address supply chain issues. It's important not to confuse this with any major trust reorientation that gives businesses allowance to increase their dependencies on China. The objective, on the contrary, would be to use this thaw to build alternatives without losing out in the immediate run.
Even the US is trying to balance similar contradictions in its China folder, where on the one hand it recognises Beijing as its main competitor and long-term threat, but is willing to talk on securing supply chains for its industry. Even Japan and South Korea are working at ways to ease trade tensions with China.
In many ways, a new China realism is at play, where there's an acceptance to deal with Beijing in recognition of its leverage in supply chains as well as its tendency to weaponise this advantage for political gains. So, if the Trump administration is looking to cut deals with China on supply of rare earth magnets, India must also guard its interests.
From an Indian standpoint, there's a basis to this normalisation which flows from the improvement of the situation on the Line of Actual Control. While the de-escalation process is yet to take shape, there are reports of some thinning out of troops. This gives room for conversations on the economic side, which is needed to ensure India is not battling on multiple fronts.
If India has supply chain issues, China has its own list of complaints starting with the intensive screening of its companies. It has worries about the future of investments, already locked in India before the Galwan clashes, besides issues arising from investigations into its entities by Indian law enforcement agencies.
Eventually, it's about maintaining peace and tranquility on LAC because New Delhi has politically linked this to the economic conversation with Beijing. The earlier dictum, one pushed by China, was to not let differences over the LAC impact development of relations in other areas. Now, of course, the two have been linked, with India conveying constantly that differences should not turn into disputes.
By this logic, a thaw on LAC should reflect progress on other fronts. The recent spate of political and official visits, including by external affairs minister S Jaishankar, signal this willingness to re-engage.
What India has consciously not done is to politically link the Sino-Pak axis with the bilateral relationship. It's a threat that India will have to counter, for now, through geopolitical play with the US.
After all, it's the America question that bothers China. It always wants to know what are India's plans with the US? Will it turn into an alliance against China? What's the big idea with Quad? India mostly answers back, also with the question: What is China doing with Pakistan?
Both hedge, knowing well the value of the leverage they hold. Which is why the current thaw should be seen, as a strategic adjustment to buy time for Indian business to derisk supply chains, build alternatives and not a licence to integrate further.
Does this signal a strategic shift? Not really, because China's active political and military support to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor is a warning on how deep this nexus runs. At the same time, Indian business is grappling with supply chain issues with China, hit also by latest restrictions on rare earth magnets, other elements and added certification requirements.
At best, it's a pragmatic approach to address supply chain issues. It's important not to confuse this with any major trust reorientation that gives businesses allowance to increase their dependencies on China. The objective, on the contrary, would be to use this thaw to build alternatives without losing out in the immediate run.
Even the US is trying to balance similar contradictions in its China folder, where on the one hand it recognises Beijing as its main competitor and long-term threat, but is willing to talk on securing supply chains for its industry. Even Japan and South Korea are working at ways to ease trade tensions with China.
In many ways, a new China realism is at play, where there's an acceptance to deal with Beijing in recognition of its leverage in supply chains as well as its tendency to weaponise this advantage for political gains. So, if the Trump administration is looking to cut deals with China on supply of rare earth magnets, India must also guard its interests.
From an Indian standpoint, there's a basis to this normalisation which flows from the improvement of the situation on the Line of Actual Control. While the de-escalation process is yet to take shape, there are reports of some thinning out of troops. This gives room for conversations on the economic side, which is needed to ensure India is not battling on multiple fronts.
If India has supply chain issues, China has its own list of complaints starting with the intensive screening of its companies. It has worries about the future of investments, already locked in India before the Galwan clashes, besides issues arising from investigations into its entities by Indian law enforcement agencies.
Eventually, it's about maintaining peace and tranquility on LAC because New Delhi has politically linked this to the economic conversation with Beijing. The earlier dictum, one pushed by China, was to not let differences over the LAC impact development of relations in other areas. Now, of course, the two have been linked, with India conveying constantly that differences should not turn into disputes.
By this logic, a thaw on LAC should reflect progress on other fronts. The recent spate of political and official visits, including by external affairs minister S Jaishankar, signal this willingness to re-engage.
What India has consciously not done is to politically link the Sino-Pak axis with the bilateral relationship. It's a threat that India will have to counter, for now, through geopolitical play with the US.
After all, it's the America question that bothers China. It always wants to know what are India's plans with the US? Will it turn into an alliance against China? What's the big idea with Quad? India mostly answers back, also with the question: What is China doing with Pakistan?
Both hedge, knowing well the value of the leverage they hold. Which is why the current thaw should be seen, as a strategic adjustment to buy time for Indian business to derisk supply chains, build alternatives and not a licence to integrate further.
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